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After the failed attempts in Seattle in late 1999, the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Doha, in November 2001 launched the agenda for a new comprehensive 
round of multilateral trade negotiations. At the behest of the EU, the ministerial declaration 
emphasized that the Doha Round should provide a major opportunity for developing countries.  
Consequently the agenda for new WTO round has been coined the ‘Doha Development 
Agenda’.  In this paper we explore the likely economic effects of the new WTO “Doha 
Development Round” for major developed and developing regions.  While the  methodology 
employed is comparable to that used in recent studies of these issues, we extend this literature by 
including market structure and investment effects in the modeling exercise, and by stressing a 
policy benchmark including China’s accession to the WTO, the Agenda 2000 reforms to the 
CAP, enlargement of the EU.  We cover the areas of agricultural liberalization, liberalization in 
industrial tariffs, liberalization in services trade, and trade facilitation measures. Our services 
scenarios build on gravity-equation based estimates of services barriers. 
The core of our analysis is structured around a set of scenarios.  These scenarios are based 
on alternative liberalization approaches for agriculture, manufactured goods, and services trade. 
They are meant to illustrate the implications of alternative approaches to market access 
liberalization. They are stylized rather than exact representations.  In part, this is because we are 
working with an aggregate model (i.e. we do not model trade at the 6-digit HS level), and as such 
detailed treatment of all product-specific proposals is simply impossible. In addition, the actual 
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market access modalities remain to be worked out.  In agriculture, domestic support may or may not 
be affected, developing countries may or may not have to liberalize, and certain politically sensitive 
sectors may yet again escape from meaningful liberalization. Our scenarios are themselves 
decomposed into different components, related to specific sets of countries and specific sectors and 
instruments.  This offers the advantage of allowing us (or the reader) to construct rough 
representations of hybrid liberalization experiments later, since individual components can be taken 
from different scenarios and combined.1 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the liberalization scenarios for the 
subsequent quantitative analysis. Section 3 describes briefly the modeling framework used. 
Section 4 discusses the results of our liberalization scenarios. It starts with a section on global 
results, proceeding with the results for the EU. 
 
2. The Policy Landscape and Scenarios 
Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff bindings, or 
schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules that define a maximum or ceiling rate for 
trade restrictions. The coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of the initial 
conditions for the negotiations. Table 2.1 provides information on the share of industrial-
product tariffs (on a trade-weighted basis) that remains either unbound or bound above applied 
rates. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are generally bound, many Asian and 
African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more than a four-fold increase in the coverage 
of developing-country tariff bindings in the Uruguay Round (Abreu 1996). For almost all 
developing countries, existing bindings are, on average, well above applied rates, reflecting a 
combination of relatively high initial bindings, and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied 
rates.  (See Blackhurst et al 1996, Francois 2001). 
 In addition to general Uruguay Round commitments, there have also been efforts for 
sector-based commitments to implement zero tariffs (called “zero-for-zero”).  This is reflected in 
the next-to-last column of Table 2-1. As a result of zero-for-zero efforts, OECD economies 
have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff lines bound at zero percent.  Most developing 
countries have opted out of this process.  Zero-for-zero increased developed country duty-free 
imports to 43% of total imports (Laird 1998). The process itself ground to a halt after the initial 
                                                 
1 Technically, decomposition of general equilibrium-related effects of policy scenarios exhibits path 
dependence, meaning that the decomposition can be sensitive to the ordering of the elements of the 
experiment set.  The impact of a particular instrument is also sensitive to the other members of the set.  
We employ a linear decomposition method in this paper that addresses the path dependence problem 
(Harrison et al 2000).  As such, individual experiment elements are roughly additive.  
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Information Technology Agreement (ITA).  This seems to have been for two reasons: (i) the 
sectors in which OECD economies could easily reach agreement had already been included, and 
(ii) those sectors remaining involve North-South issues not susceptible to this approach.  In 
other words, the cherries have been picked, leaving us with the hard nuts.  
 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
 
 With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem tariffs in 
the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent.  This is reflected in the first columns of 
Table 2.2.2  However, there are important exceptions.  One of these is textiles and clothing, 
where the average rate is roughly three times this overall average.  This is reflected in the 
standard deviation and maximum tariff columns.  With full implementation of current 
commitments, the estimated simple average industrial tariff in the United States is 3.2 percent, 
with a standard deviation of 4.3, and a maximum tariff of 37.5 percent.  The European Union 
has a higher average, but less dispersion. (The EU has an average of 3.7 percent, a standard 
deviation of 3.6 percent, and a maximum tariff of 17 percent.)  For the developing countries in 
Table 2.1, average industrial tariffs range from a low of 3 to 4 percent to a high of more than 20 
percent.  Table 2.2 presents detailed data for three developing countries:  Brazil, India, and 
Thailand.  These countries span the spectrum of developing country bindings as reflected in 
Table 2.1.  Brazil’s tariffs are all bound, though the average rate for industrial products is 14.9 
percentage points above the current applied rate.  This gap is called a “binding overhang.”  (See 
Francois and Martin 2003.) India and Thailand’s tariffs are partially covered by bindings, again 
with significant binding overhang. In general, for developing countries, binding overhang is large 
enough that reductions in the range of 50% are necessary to force any reductions in average 
applied rates for countries like Brazil.  For many countries, even this will have little or no effect, 
as tariffs are largely unbound.  Of course, this limits severely the negotiating leverage of 
developing countries in the WTO. This is also why the debate over using bound, applied, or 
“historic” rates in the WTO as a starting point for negotiations is important. 
 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
 
                                                 
2 For agriculture, Table 2.2 only covers notified ad valorem tariffs, and hence omits specific tariffs and 
quantity based measures that abound in agricultural trade.  
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 As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture negotiations was 
also set by the Uruguay Round outcome -- this time by the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA).  One key difference from industrial products is that essentially all 
agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial and developing countries, there is a 
large degree of binding overhang resulting from “dirty tariffication” or the use of “ceiling 
bindings” (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). The next round of agricultural negotiations was 
scheduled in the URAA, while the negotiating parameters (tariffs, tariff-rate-quota levels, subsidy 
commitments, etc.) must also be viewed in the context of the schedules of URAA commitments.  
The system that has emerged is complex and similar to arrangements in the textile and clothing 
sectors, featuring a mix of bilaterally allocated tariff-rate-quotas (with associated quota rents) and 
tariffs. Viewed in conjunction with industrial protection, the basic pattern is that the industrial 
countries protect agriculture and processed food, while protection in developing countries is 
more balanced (though also higher overall) in its focus on food and non-food manufactured 
goods.   
 The URAA had a stated goal of no backsliding and modest liberalization.  However, 
negotiating parties (generally the relevant agriculture ministries) gave considerable leeway to 
themselves with regard to selection of the appropriate reference period from which to measure 
export subsidy reductions.  In addition, the move to a price-based system for protection has, in 
many cases, been subsumed into an effective adoption of explicit quotas.  The disciplines on 
domestic subsidies have also been weakened by a relatively soft definition of the aggregate measure 
of support (AMS) vis-à-vis individual subsidies and the scope for reallocation of expenditures within 
the AMS.  (See Tangermann 1998 for discussion.)  Commitments not to erode current market 
access were meant to limit the scope for increased protection through dirty tariffication.  As the 
name implies, dirty tariffication involved violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the URAA text.  
It involved setting tariff bindings at rates far above then current effective protection rates.  The 
practice of setting high bindings complicated the problem of measuring the impact of further 
commitments to reduce bindings.  Basically, in agriculture, we are in a world that allows scope for 
great policy discretion and uncertainty as a result of the loose nature of the commitments made.  In 
addition, the setting of high bound rates made possible the conversion of NTBs into even more 
restrictive import tariffs.  This in turn made quantity disciplines necessary to avoid backsliding. As a 
result, despite the stated goals of subsidy reductions and a shift toward price-based border measures, 
one of the more striking features of the regime that has actually emerged from the URAA is the 
prominent role that quantity measures have taken in the new architecture.  Basically, the agricultural 
trading system is complicated and still evolving. Policy measurement in this area has converged on 
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the use of price-based measurements that emphasize the tax/subsidy equivalent of policy.  (As this 
approach reflects available data, this is the approach we employ in this paper as well.)   
For services, “market access” is a problematic concept.   From the outset, service 
negotiations have been "qualitative."  They have not targeted numeric measures, but rather 
commitments in the cross-border movement of consumers and providers and the establishment 
of foreign providers.  In fact, for academics, the GATS seems to confuse FDI and migration 
with international trade.  As a result, efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic 
requirement if we want to then quantify liberalization) have been problematic at best.  The 
standard approach (an example is Hoekman 1995) has been to produce inventory measures.  As 
an alternative approach, we have produced estimates of "tariff equivalents" for services trade.  
These are based on a simple gravity model, estimated from detailed global trade data for services 
trade in 1997.  The basic approach is described in an annex to this paper (available upon 
request).  The resulting estimates are summarized in Table 2.3.  The estimates are admittedly 
crude.  The pattern that emerges is consistent with that for industrial tariffs.  It appears that 
barriers to services trade are higher (often much higher) in developing countries than in the 
OECD.  Hence, as in the case of industrial tariffs, the effects of further GATS negotiations will 
hinge critically on developing country participation or non-participation, and the extent to which 
they commit to actual liberalization rather than stand-stills (the qualitative equivalent of ceiling 
bindings). 
 
[Table 2.3 about here] 
   
With the reduction in traditional trade barriers, attention in the regional and multilateral 
trade arenas has not only shifted to quantity restrictions, but also to trade facilitation measures.  
These are meant to target less transparent trade barriers, such as customs procedures, product 
standards and conformance certifications, licensing requirements, and related administrative 
sources of trading costs.  Studies of regional integration initiatives (Baldwin and Francois 1999, 
Smith and Venables 1988) have emphasized the potential for liberalization initiatives to 
substantially reduce such barriers.  Conceptually, these costs are different from the price and 
quantity measures used for manufactures and agriculture.  They are a pure global deadweight 
loss. 
The estimates of trading costs are very rough (at best).  Nonetheless, they provide some 
sense of the magnitudes involved.  An overview of estimates is provided in Table 2.4.  In the 
context of the EC single market program, elimination of internal customs procedures and related 
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administrative streamlining were projected to reduce trading costs by up to 2 percent of the value 
of trade (EC 1988).  Globally, UNCTAD (1994) has noted that trading costs represent 7 to 10 
percent of the cost of delivered goods.  Like the EC, UNCTAD also estimates that simple trade 
facilitation measures could reduce these costs by 2 percent of the value of trade.  The Australian 
Industry Commission (1995) has estimated potentially higher savings in the context of APEC, 
ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the value of trade.  Under more modest facilitation initiatives, 
the Japanese Economic Planning Agency (1997) has estimated savings at 2 percent in an APEC 
context, while Francois (2001) has employed a similar range of estimates. 
 
[Table 2.4 about here] 
 
To bring these elements together, we define three sets of scenarios (See Table 2.5).  The 
first two are partial liberalization scenarios. In the “Linear 50%” all trade instruments are reduced 
by 50%. This involves a 50% reduction in agricultural and industrial tariffs and export subsidies, 
a 50% reduction in OECD domestic support for agriculture, a 50% reduction in the tariff-
equivalent of services barriers, and a partial reduction in trading costs, related to trade facilitation 
measures.  Services liberalization involves a 50% or a full reduction in the barriers shown in 
Table 2.3. The second partial liberalization experiment is called the “Swiss formula” experiment. 
In this experiment the reduction in import tariffs in agriculture and manufacture is  based on a 
straight Swiss formula with a coefficient of 0.25, meaning the maximum tariff is reduced to 25%.  
(See Francois and Martin 2003). The third scenario simply involves full elimination of all trade 
barriers. Trade facilitation, based on the range of available estimates, is assumed to range 
between 1.5 percent of the value of trade (partial liberalization) and 3 percent (full liberalization).   
[Table 2.5 about here] 
 
Each experiment is decomposed, both in terms of sectors and instruments, and also in 
terms of country grouping.  We use the decomposition algorithm for non-linear policy 
experiments outlined in Harison et al (2000).  An example of the basic results structure is given 
in Table 2.6, where the  welfare effects (equivalent variation) are decomposed across sectoral 
instruments and regions.  Because of the decomposition method used, the reader can roughly 
pick and choose, combining the results of hybrid experiments involving elements from different 
experiments, for a rough sense of possible effects. For example, if in the next WTO round, the 
outcome will be only 50% liberalization in manufactures in all regions and trade facilitation only 
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in OECD countries, the estimated world welfare effect is approximately $83 billion ($37 billion 
due to liberalization in manufacturing and $46 billion due to trade facilitation in the OECD). 
Finally, for each of the experiments we employ alternative model features (these model 
features are discussed in more detail in section 3.2). First, we include short-run versus long-run 
effects. In the short-run capital stocks are fixed and in the long-run capital stocks adjust (See 
Francois et al 1997). Second, we alternatively employ perfect competition and imperfect 
competition in the manufacturing and services sectors. With perfect competition we assume 
constant returns to scale and with imperfect competition we assume monopolistic competition 
with increasing returns to scale, firm-level product differentiation, and average cost pricing.  The 
model therefore includes the basic features of “economic geography” models, including 
intermediate linkages, monopolistic competition, and returns from specialization. (See Francois 
and Nelson 2002). For the agricultural sectors (except for the food processing industry) we 
maintain constant returns to scale in all cases.  We use the constant returns to scale scenario 
mainly as a benchmark scenario to assess the impact of the increasing returns to scale features 
and it facilitates comparison with other studies that mainly use constant returns to scale in all 
sectors.  A similar approach was followed in the ex-ante literature on the Uruguay Round.  (See 
Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1997).   
 
 
3. The Model and Data 
We turn to a brief overview of the global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used 
here.  The full set of model code, datasets, and background documentation is available for 
download.  [http://www.intereconomics.com/francois].  The model is characterized by an 
input-output structure (based on regional and national input-output tables) that explicitly links 
industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over continuously higher stages of 
intermediate processing, to the final assembling of goods and services for consumption.  Inter-
sectoral linkages are direct, like the input of steel in the production of transport equipment, and 
indirect, via intermediate use in other sectors.  The model captures these linkages by modelling 
firms' use of factors and intermediate inputs.  The most important aspects of the model can be 
summarized as follows:  (i) it covers all world trade and production; (ii) it allows for scale 
economies and imperfect competition; (iii) it includes intermediate linkages between sectors; (iv) 
and it allows for trade to affect capital stocks through investment effects.  The last point means 
we model medium to long-run investment effects.  The inclusion of scale economies and 
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imperfect competition implies agglomeration effects like those emphasized in the recent 
economic geography literature.  
 
3.1 Model Data and the Benchmark 
Our data come from a number of sources.  Data on production and trade are based on national 
social accounting data linked through trade flows (see Reinert and Roland-Holst 1997).  These 
social accounting data are drawn directly from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
dataset, version 5.2. (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  The GTAP version 5 dataset is 
benchmarked to 1997, and includes detailed national input-output, trade, and final demand 
structures.  The basic social accounting and trade data are supplemented with trade policy data, 
including additional data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  
The data on tariffs are taken from the WTO's integrated database, with supplemental 
information from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed pre- and post-Uruguay Round 
tariff schedules and from the UNCTAD/World Bank WITS dataset.  All of this tariff 
information has been concorded to GTAP model sectors. Services trade barriers are based on 
the gravity model estimates described in the annex to this paper (available upon request).  We 
also work with the schedule of China accession commitments. While the basic GTAP dataset is 
benchmarked to 1997, and reflects applied tariffs actually in place in 1997, we of course want to 
work with a representation of a post-Uruguay Round world.  We also want to include the 
accession of China, the enlargement of the EU, and Agenda 2000 reforms as part of the baseline.  
To accomplish this, before conducting any policy experiments we first run a "pre-experiment" in 
which we do the following:  
§ implement the rest of the Uruguay Round tariff commitments, 
§ implement the ATC (agreement on textiles and clothing), phasing-out quotas, 
§ implement China’s accession to the WTO, 
§ implement Agenda 2000, 
§ and Implement the EU enlargement. 
As such, the dataset we work with for actual experiments is a representation of a notional world 
economy (with values in 1997 dollars) wherein we have realized many of the trade policy reforms 
already programmed for the next few years. 
The social accounting data have been aggregated to 17 sectors and 16 regions. The 
sectors and regions for the 17x16 aggregation of the data are given in Table 3.1 (a more detailed 
mapping between the aggregated sectors and regions and the original GTAP regions and sectors 
is given in a technical annex available with the downloadable model files). 
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3.2 Theoretical structure 
We turn next to the basic theoretical features of the model.  In all regions there is a single 
representative, composite household in each region, with expenditures allocated over personal 
consumption and savings (future consumption) and over government expenditures. The 
composite household owns endowments of the factors of production and receives income by 
selling them to firms. It also receives income from tariff revenue and rents accruing from 
import/export quota licenses (when applicable). Part of the income is distributed as subsidy 
payments to some sectors, primarily in agriculture.  
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors (capital, 
labor and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources to produce outputs 
in the most cost-efficient way that technology allows.  Perfect competition is assumed in the 
agricultural sectors as indicated in Table 3.1 (notice that the processed food products sector is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale). In these sectors, products from different regions are 
assumed to be imperfect substitutes in accordance with the so-called "Armington" assumption. 
Production under imperfect competition is discussed below.   
 
[Table 3.1 about here] 
 
Prices on goods and factors adjust until all markets are simultaneously in (general) 
equilibrium.  This means that we solve for equilibria in which all markets clear.  While we model 
changes in gross trade flows, we do not model changes in net international capital flows. Rather 
our capital market closure involves fixed net capital inflows and outflows.  This does not 
preclude changes in gross capital flows.  (See the Hertel el al 1997 discussion on macroeconomic 
closure.  The present approach facilitates welfare analysis.) To summarize, factor markets are 
competitive, and labor and capital are mobile between sectors but not between regions. All 
primary factors, labor, land and capital are fully employed within each region. 
We model manufacturing and services as involving imperfect competition.  The 
approach followed involves monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition involves scale 
economies that are internal to each firm, depending on its own production level. In particular, 
based on estimates of price-cost markups, we model the sector as being characterized by 
Chamberlinian large-group monopolistic competition. An important property of the 
monopolistic competition model is that increased specialization at intermediate stages of 
production yields returns due to specialization, where the sector as a whole becomes more 
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productive the broader the range of specialized inputs.  These gains spill over through two-way 
trade in specialized intermediate goods.  With these spillovers, trade liberalization can lead to 
global scale effects related to specialization.  With international scale economies, regional welfare 
effects depend on a mix of efficiency effects, global scale effects, and terms-of-trade effects.   
Similar gains follow from consumer good specialization.  
Another important feature involves a dynamic link, whereby the static or direct income 
effects of trade liberalization induce shifts in the regional pattern of savings and investment.  
These effects have been explored extensively in the trade literature, and relate to classical models 
of capital accumulation and growth, rather than to endogenous growth mechanisms.  Theory on 
this approach includes Smith (1976, 1977) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1980).  Several studies 
of the Uruguay Round (see for example Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom 1993 and Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr 1997) also incorporated variations on this mechanism, along with variations 
in market structure. Such effects compound initial output welfare effects over the medium-run, 
and can magnify income gains or losses. How much these "accumulation effects" will 
supplement static effects depends on a number of factors, including the marginal product of 
capital and underlying savings behaviour.   It also hinges on interactions with market structure. 
In the present application, we work with a classical savings-investment mechanism.  This means 
we model long-run linkages between changes in income, savings, and investment.  The results 
reported here therefore include changes in the capital stock, and the medium- to long-run 
implications of such changes.   
 
4. Results 
We now turn to the results of the experiments outlined in chapter two. Tables 4-1 to 4-4 present 
a summary of results at the global level.  The tables present a breakdown of the national income 
effects (technically measured as equivalent variation) resulting from the various policy 
experiments along the lines of major sector components.  Table 4-1 is focused on agriculture, 
Table 4-2 is focused on manufactures, Tables 4-3 is focused on services liberalization, and Table 
4-4 focuses on trade facilitation. The tables also give a breakdown of the effects of scale 
economies, through a comparison of a perfect competition version of the model to the one with 
scale economies and imperfect competition.  We consider the increasing returns case to be the 
most relevant, and unless indicated otherwise, the discussion of results pertains to this version of 
the model.   
 
[Tables 4-1,2,3,4 about here] 
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Overall, while agriculture has been a consistent sticking point in negotiations, with 
agriculture exporters in particular pressing for agricultural liberalization, the overall effects are 
not as clear-cut.  From the set of income effect tables, we can see that agricultural liberalization 
offers an uneven set of results.  Liberalization of domestic support in the OECD, on the one 
hand, is generally positive for the OECD, though with negative consequences for the food-
importing sub-Saharan Africa.  We find that significant, though limited, liberalization yields 
positive results globally, and regionally for Europe, Africa, and most of Asia.  On the other hand, 
on net agricultural liberalization is a mixed-bag, with gains in most areas from elimination of 
domestic support, but with more mixed results from the elimination of border measures.  Static 
results are consistently positive if constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed, but induced 
changes in investment (not shown in all tables), combined with the imperfect competition and 
agglomeration features of the model, both point to negative effects over the longer-run. 
Specifically, we note the following.  First, Australia and New Zealand, both net agricultural 
exporters who generally favor agricultural liberalization, are not clear winners from agriculture 
liberalization.  In addition, the Mediterranean countries who are close to the EU and are usually 
expected to gain as well from liberalization in the heavily protected EU agricultural markets are 
not clear winners.  In addition, other non-OECD countries (India, China, South Africa, SSA) 
who do not liberalize themselves loose anyway under agricultural liberalization even as their 
access to OECD markets is improved.  Finally, the gains for South America are very limited 
relative to expectations.  
In order to understand why results and rhetoric do not necessarily match in agriculture, it 
is helps to distinguish the standard perfect competition aspect of the analysis, which is held in 
common with most ex-ante Doha studies use, from the additional effects related to product 
differentiation and agglomeration (IRS).  With IRS, expanding agricultural sectors draw resources 
from industrial sectors. As a consequence, the industrial sectors have to contract, which has 
negative implications for welfare because of a loss of agglomeration and variety effects. This 
illustrates a point lurking in the recent literature on new economic geography and trade. If 
liberalization leads to specialization and expansion of constant or decreasing returns sectors, this 
may be inferior compared to the status quo or to a policy-induced expansion in IRS sectors 
alongside trade liberalization. In the latter case, the traditional gains from liberalization are 
magnified by agglomeration and variety effects. The pattern of results therefore highlights the 
importance of taking a long-term structural view. CAIRNS group countries should perhaps be 
cautious about expecting long-term economy-wide gains if, as a result of liberalization, the 
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agricultural sector draws more resources away from other productive uses. Developing countries 
also need to think carefully about the risks of reinforcing an emphasis on primary exports. 
The pattern for manufacturing liberalization is more consistent and generally positive, 
both in the initial static results and over the long-term.  From Table 4.2 the most important area 
for manufacturing tariff liberalization for developing countries is the developing countries 
themselves.  Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that OECD tariffs are, on average, below 3 
percent for manufacturing.  As a result, the impact of a Swiss-formula (which targets high tariffs) 
yields only limited effects on the OECD, while directly proportional cuts have a more dramatic 
effect.  The one region consistently, and significantly, hurt by significant manufacturing 
liberalization is China.  Once the WTO accession is fully implemented (as assumed in our 
baseline), China will have realized most of the effects of its own trade policy reforms. Hence, the 
Doha round cannot be expected to yield much additional gain in this respect. The negative 
results for China  follow from an erosion of its terms of trade, driven by its growth in textile 
exports, combined with increased competition from other low wage countries.  Natural 
competitors, such as India, currently limit their participation on world markets through a mix of 
import and export barriers.  Rationalization in this area by developing countries leads to 
heightened competition against China in a number of sectors, with the result being income losses 
for China driven almost entirely by manufacturing and agricultural liberalization in the 
developing world.  
Another important source of overall effects is services, which yields static income gains 
on a par with remaining manufacturing tariffs, and ranging potentially to over $50 billion 
globally.  One obvious winner from services liberalization is the United States, which is projected 
to pick up a substantial share of total gains.  Another big winner in services, however, is 
somewhat less obvious.  India, which has moved in recent years to become a major exporter in 
services (including software and back office services) is projected to be a bigger potential winner 
from services liberalization than North America.   In fact, as a share of GDP, services is a more 
important source of gains for India than agriculture and manufacturing liberalization combined.  
The other important source of gains for India (and for much of the world) is trade facilitation.  
In the Asia-Pacific region, where exports alone are often 50 percent of GDP, trade facilitation 
yields a dramatic short-run effects as well as a long-run impact driven by investment effects 
(Table 4.4).   For the Asia-Pacific developing countries, the single most important issue is trade 
facilitation, particularly by other developing countries. 
In terms of labor market effects, both unskilled and skilled workers gain from the partial 
and full liberalization scenarios in most regions, except for some cases in the CEEC economies 
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and China.  In China, the results are linked to the trade and income effects following from 
competition with other low-wag exporters, as discussed above.   The general pattern of wage 
effects is summarized in Figure 4.1, which shows percent changes in wages for unskilled workers 
in all regions, under all three scenarios.  The basic pattern is clear – positive wage effects 
everywhere, under all scenarios, except for China in all cases and the CEECs in some cases. 
The general pattern of export effects (reported in detail in the annex tables available as 
part of the model files package) is summarized in Figure 4.2.  Like Figure 4.1, the emphasis here 
is not on individual values, but the general pattern of results.  Export growth, under all scenarios, 
is greatest in the developing countries, especially in Asia and the Pacific (including India and 
China), but also in the Mediterranean, African, and Latin American economies.  The CEECs 
suffer from trade-erosion with respect to market access to the EU15 economies. A 
decomposition of bilateral trade effects shows that much of the potential gains for developing 
countries depend on the realization of South-South trade opportunities. While improved access 
to OECD markets is certainly important, it is equally pressing to engage in meaningful 
liberalization of trade amongst developing countries. As middle-income countries are shifting 
their export packages towards more processed products, the sourcing of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs can increasingly take place in low-income countries.  
The European Union provides a natural experiment with respect to the erosion of trade 
diversion incentives in the face of multilateral liberalization.  The EU is a customs union, with a 
common external tariff against supplies from third countries, and practically zero tariffs within 
the union. Lower external trade barriers affect producers and consumers in member states in two 
related ways. First there is the direct boost to competition on home markets through improved 
market access for suppliers from outside the European Union. Second, the relative position of 
suppliers within the EU might change. The formation of the EU customs union leads, by 
definition, to trade preferences amongst the members of the free trade area. As a consequence 
the share of trade that is within the EU (intra-EU trade) is typically biased upward, and trade 
within the EU is larger than might be expected on the basis of geographic proximity and other 
trade promoting factors alone. With the recent eastward enlargement the preferences are 
extended from the current 15 EU members to the new member states.3 Recall that the 
enlargement process has been incorporated in our baseline scenario.  
                                                 
3 Our simulations include all 12  accession candidates newcomers, i.e. we also include Bulgaria and 
Romania, although these two countries will  not enter the EU with the first wave of new member 
countries.  
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The lowering of external trade barriers by the EU will inevitably lead to the erosion of 
the intra-EU trade preferences. Suppliers with lower cost will be able to enter the EU markets 
once the tariff barriers have come down that currently shield domestic producers from foreign 
competition.  Consequently, we can expect the current bias towards intra-EU trade to be 
reduced. Table 4.5 illustrates this effect by breaking down the simulated change in EU27 import 
values for one of the more modest liberalisation scenarios. 
 
[Table 4.5 about here] 
 
The 2% growth in EU27 exports is small compared to the 12% growth in world trade.  A 
first driver of this result is that EU countries mostly trade amongst themselves. The benefits 
from removing the intra-EU barriers have already been realised in the past and there are no 
additional gains for intra-EU trade in a new WTO round. A second driver of this result is the 
increased competition from non-EU countries on EU markets. Simulated intra -EU27 trade 
shrinks by -6% as other suppliers enter the EU markets. The most impressive growth in markets 
share is realized by suppliers from developing countries, who are simulated to expand their 
exports to the EU by 30%, compared to the 12% increase of imports from other developed 
countries.  
Because there is no positive growth to be expected from intra-EU trade, European 
exports can only by increased by expansion in non-EU markets. Exports to developing countries 
grow with 21% and exports to the other regions grow with 13%. Although these growth figures 
are high, this is insufficient to significantly boost total exports as their weight in total EU27 
exports is limited. 
Developing countries obtain the highest growth in exports (30%).  They expand exports 
to all destinations, though the largest trade surge is observed for intra-developing country trade. 
Global trade creation in this experiment amounts to 12% in the short run and 15% in the long 
run. While the trade increase materialises already in the short run for the EU and other 
developed economies, developing countries see even larger growth in their exports in the longer 
term. Dynamic capital accumulation enables them to specialise more in exportable goods.  
Trade (both exports and imports) between the EU and developing countries expands  
relatively faster in our experiments than trade with developed countries. Already low trade 
barriers amongst OECD countries explains this. An interesting case is Textiles and Clothing. 
Recall that our experiment assumes that current quota regime, called the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing or ATC and having grown out of the multifibre arrangement or MFA, is already 
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phased out (this is part of the baseline simulation), and the trade liberalisation experiment 
subsequently lowers the import tariffs on textiles and clothing. This greatly boosts exports from 
developing countries into the EU, and it crowds out the imports from developed economies and 
from CEECs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the possible economic effects of the new WTO Doha Round of trade 
negotiations for major developed and developing regions. Our modelling exercise includes 
market structure and investment effects, and it stresses a policy benchmark including China’s 
accession to the WTO, the Agenda 2000 reforms to the CAP, enlargement of the EU.  The 
analysis focuses on market access and agricultural support. We cover the areas of agricultural 
liberalization, liberalization in industrial tariffs, liberalization in services trade, and trade 
facilitation measures.  
We argue that  the modalities for tariff reduction are at least as important as size of cuts.  
For example, in agriculture cuts in bound rates greater than 50% are required to effectively 
reduce applied rates in a country like Brazil.  In view of the potential impact, trade facilitation 
and liberalisation in services may also need a higher valuation vis-à-vis agriculture in the current 
round of negotiations.  For agricultural liberalisation on the other hand, we find quite mixed 
results. Given the current protection landscape, OECD countries are expected to achieve 
allocative efficiency gains if they engage in own agricultural liberalisation.  Reduction of domestic 
support in OECD countries is certainly not unequivocally beneficial for all developing countries. 
On the contrary, those developing countries that are depending on food imports, and which do 
not have the resource base to develop their food  sectors, will not benefit from the higher prices 
brought about by liberalisation in industrial countries.   In addition, for some primary exporters, 
the addition of agglomeration effects in non-primary sectors highlights possible negative effects 
related to primary specialization following improved market access conditions. This last point 
also highlights the importance of a long-term structural view on the effects of trade liberalisation. 
Even for countries with a strong natural resource base, such as the CAIRNS group, it is not 
necessarily the case that expansion of primary  exports is beneficial in the long run.   
Finally, a key finding  is the importance of effective participation by developing countries 
in the negotiations, especially in manufacturing and trade facilitation.  South-South trade 
liberalization is key to the “development” part of the Doha Development Agenda. However, this 
is downplayed in the current negotiations by all WTO-partners, with an emphasis instead on 
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Industrial tariff rates and bindings -- post UR and ITA 
 Percent of MFN imports that are subject to: Tariff lines  




or bound above 
applied rates 
Share of bound 
duty free tariff 
lines to total tar. 
lines 
Total tariff lines 
Argentina 100.0 0.0 99.9 99.9 0.0 10530 
Australia 96.9 3.1 31.7 34.8 17.7 5520 
Brazil 100.0 0.0 91.0 91.0 0.5 10860 
Canada 99.8 0.2 45.7 45.9 34.5 6261 
Chile 100.0 0.0 99.7 99.7 0.0 5055 
Colombia 100.0 0.0 97.7 97.7 0.0 6145 
El Salvador 97.1 2.9 96.0 98.9 0.0 4922 
European Union 100.0 0.0 17.7 17.7 26.9 7635 
Hungary 93.6 6.4 3.3 9.7 10.4 5896 
India 69.3 30.7 14.8 45.5 0.0 4354 
Indonesia 92.3 7.7 86.6 94.3 0.0 7735 
Japan 95.9 4.1 0.1 4.2 47.4 7339 
Korea 89.8 10.2 3.4 13.6 11.6 8882 
Malaysia 79.3 20.7 31.0 51.7 1.6 10832 
México 100.0 0.0 98.4 98.4 0.0 11255 
New Zealand 100.0 0.0 46.5 46.5 39.5 5894 
Norway 100.0 0.0 36.5 36.5 46.6 5326 
Peru 100.0 0.0 98.5 98.5 0.0 4545 
Phillipines 67.4 32.6 15.5 48.1 0.0 5387 
Poland 92.8 7.2 44.6 51.8 2.2 4354 
Singapore 36.5 63.5 11.7 75.2 15.2 4963 
Sri Lanka 9.2 90.8 1.4 92.2 0.1 5933 
Thailand 67.4 32.6 8.9 41.5 0.0 5244 
Tunisia 67.9 32.1 41.5 73.6 0.0 5087 
Turkey 49.3 50.7 0.0 50.7 1.4 15479 
United States 100.0 0.0 14.0 14.0 39.4 7872 
Uruguay 100.0 0.0 96.3 96.3 0.0 10530 
Venezuela 100.0 0.0 90.3 90.3 0.0 5974 
Zimbabwe 13.6 86.4 3.9 90.3 3.0 1929 
       






Table 2.2  
Summary of Effects of Basic S wiss Formula Reductions: Applied tariffs before and after a 50% cut in average tariff bindings 
 Agriculture           






















5.9 7.5 74.9 0.3 3.0 2.9 10.9 0.1 -48.6 
Japan 6.2 8.1 43.3 1.2 3.5 3.7 13.9 0.2 -43.0 
United States 3.5 7.4 90.0 0.5 1.9 2.4 11.5 0.1 -46.6 
Brazil 12.9 5.1 27.0 22.6 12.4 4.6 22.3 5.3 -3.7 
India 31.0 20.8 150.0 90.7 29.5 14.9 70.8 31.3 -4.8 
Thailand 26.5 14.4 65.0 7.1 15.1 6.3 30.1 1.7 -43.0 
 Non-agriculture         






















3.7 3.6 17.0 0.4 1.9 1.4 5.0 0.1 -47.7 
Japan 2.3 3.4 30.9 0.1 1.2 1.4 5.6 0.0 -48.5 
United States 3.2 4.3 37.5 0.2 1.7 1.6 6.1 0.0 -48.3 
Brazil 15.9 6.0 35.0 14.9 13.5 4.2 16.7 1.9 -15.4 
India 19.2 16.5 40.0 3.9 11.3 9.2 30.5 0.3 -41.3 
Thailand 10.5 10.8 80.0 7.8 7.2 6.1 20.7 2.0 -31.6 




Table 2.3  
Estimated Services Trade Barriers (percent trade cost equivalents) 








NLD Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FRA France 12.3 12.1 18.3 19.2 
DEU Germany 0.0 13.7 9.5 0.0 
REU15 Rest of EU 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEC CEECs 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MED 
Mediterannean and 
 Middle East 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NAM North America 0.0 22.6 1.2 16.0 
SAM South America 13.8 10.4 8.6 5.9 
CHINA China 0.0 14.5 37.4 3.7 
INDIA India 61.3 63.9 32.1 62.2 
HINCAS High income Asia 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSNZ 
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.0 2.3 9.5 15.2 
SAF South Africa 28.3 17.5 32.8 22.6 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW Rest of World 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Based on gravity equation estimates.  
 
Table 2.4  
ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS FROM TRADE FACILITATION 
European Commission (1992) In the context of the Single Market 
program, savings may amount to 1.6 % to 
1.7% of the value of trade due to savings 
on administrative costs of transactions 
represent 7 to 10% of the value of trade.  
UNCTAD (1994)  Trade facilitation could reduce this to 5% 
to 8%. 
Australian Industry Commission (1995) Trade facilitation may save 5% to 10% of 
the total value of trade, through reduced 
transaction costs, in the APEC context. 
Japan EPA (1997)  A “modest” APEC initiative may lead to 
2% savings (as a share of the value of 





Table 2.5  
 
Scenario definitions 
   Instruments Linear 50% Swiss formula 
Full 
liberalisation 
Import tariffs in 
 agriculture and 
 manufacturing  50% reduction 
Swiss formula 
reduction (with 





 measures in services 50% reduction 50% reduction 
100% 
reduction 




 support in OECD 




1.5% of value 
of trade 
1.5% of value 
of trade 




Table 2.6  
Total Equivalent Variation from a 
linear 50% experiment decomposed by sectoral instruments and regions,  
millions of US dollars 





Agricultural liberalization    
(border measures) 
24482 32446 4630 61558
Agricultural liberalization    
(domestic support) 
8744 - 711 9455
Manufactures                       
(border measures) 
12057 22230 2789 37076
Services liberalization 
 
17225 6907 1963 26095
Trade facilitation 
 
46159 26152 5881 78192
Total 
 
108667 87735 15974 212376







Table 3-1  




FRA France HORT* Horticulture & other crops 
DEU Germany SUGA* Sugar, plants and processed 
REU15 Rest of EU INTLIV* Intensive livestock &products 
CEEC CEECs CATLE* Cattle & beef products 
MED Mediterannean and Middle East DAIRY* Milk & dairy 
NAM North America OAGR* Other agriculture 
SAM South America PROCF Processed food products 
CHINA China TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing 
INDIA India EXTR Extraction industries 
HINCAS High income asia CHEM Petro & chemicals 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific MELE Metal and electotechnical ind 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand OIND Other industries 
SAF South Africs  TRAD Trade services 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TRAN Transport services 





 Other private and public 
services 
        







Agricultural Liberalization       
Static National Income Effects, millions of dollars (based on equivalent variation)   
  Constant returns to scale Increasing returns to scale   
  50% liberalisation of border measures 50% liberalization of border measures Full liberalization or border measures OECD Domestic Support 
  Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Partial Full 
Netherlands 139 -227 366 768 319 449 1,436 112 1,324 -16 119
France 657 193 464 1,661 1,524 136 3,312 2,543 769 2,746 4,320
Germany 809 441 368 2,307 2,122 184 4,855 4,181 674 1,110 1,534
Rest of EU 15 2815 1723 1092 5,042 4,914 128 8,651 7,647 1,004 4,576 7,069
CEECs 263 575 -312 1,702 1,143 559 4,348 2,023 2,325 -2 -202
Mediterranean 4293 269 4024 15,008 -794 15,802 22,232 -2,112 24,344 -600 -1,369
North America 3098 1358 1740 2,678 1,501 1,177 4,356 1,128 3,228 2,173 3,881
South America 2848 2052 796 2,054 162 1,892 4,366 392 3,973 -152 -289
China 1439 755 684 2,993 -374 3,367 3,549 555 2,993 -252 -577
India 165 69 96 756 -76 832 1,196 -205 1,401 -6 -35
High Income Asia 7737 7125 612 16,127 14,163 1,964 26,998 21,930 5,068 -504 -977
Other Asia-Pacific 1035 768 267 3,673 1,007 2,667 6,550 2,526 4,024 -85 -173
Australia-NZ 1261 969 292 -350 -419 70 -499 -721 222 70 185
South Africa 418 90 328 1,257 -84 1,341 2,057 -207 2,264 -38 -115
Sub-Saharan Africa 649 457 192 1,394 -194 1,588 3,162 -455 3,617 -92 -248
Rest of World 275 201 74 -141 -432 291 174 -527 700 -184 -755
Total 27901 16818 11083 56,928 24,482 32,446 96,743 38,811 57,932 8,744 12,368









Manufacturing Tariff Reductions 
Static National Income Effects, millions of dollars (based on equivalent variation) 
  Constant returns to scale Increasing returns to scale 
  50% liberalisation of border measures 50% liberalization of border measures Full liberalization or border measures 




OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD 
Netherlands 303 -178 481 947 -18 965 1,586 -315 1,901
France 981 -134 1115 2,189 386 1,803 4,649 431 4,218
Germany 1910 -125 2035 3,397 322 3,075 6,002 -719 6,721
Rest of EU 15 2689 -964 3653 7,367 534 6,833 12,018 -2,016 14,033
CEECs -3418 -2159 -1259 4,102 2,118 1,984 12,755 6,715 6,040
Mediterranean 189 1362 -1173 -1,133 1,310 -2,443 -3,206 2,186 -5,392
North America 543 -3917 4460 13,226 2,590 10,636 22,104 548 21,556
South America 203 1088 -885 -2,450 839 -3,289 -7,286 1,765 -9,051
China 1477 4175 -2698 -23,717 -9,444 -14,273 -37,826 -10,398 -27,428
India 357 548 -191 -499 427 -926 -3,991 778 -4,769
High Income Asia 9642 2088 7554 22,859 8,473 14,386 37,669 11,327 26,343
Other Asia-Pacific 1601 3140 -1539 3,244 2,320 924 1,701 3,932 -2,231
Australia-NZ -169 -198 29 787 130 657 704 -471 1,174
South Africa 240 94 146 621 248 373 1,013 446 567
Sub-Saharan Africa -128 75 -203 -156 242 -398 -574 452 -1,026
Rest of World 1214 727 487 3,503 1,579 1,924 6,928 2,705 4,222









Table 4.3  
Services Liberalization 
Static National Income Effects, millions of dollars (based on equivalent variation) 
  Constant returns to scale Increasing returns to scale 
  50% liberalisation of border measures 50% liberalization of border measures Full liberalization or border measures 
  Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD 
Netherlands 98 67 31 507 399 108 1,130 892 238
France 2,281 2,212 69 1,275 1,014 262 2,802 2,262 540
Germany 2,296 2,220 76 2,068 1,916 152 4,412 4,092 320
Rest of EU 15 798 587 211 2,031 1,579 453 4,342 3,390 953
CEECs 172 193 -21 504 372 133 970 623 347
Mediterranean 636 558 78 1,176 1,002 174 2,525 2,146 379
North America 8,742 8,461 281 7,015 6,334 681 16,260 14,805 1,456
South America 2,026 315 1,711 1,907 647 1,260 4,109 1,258 2,852
China 793 279 514 742 -280 1,022 1,524 -93 1,617
India 1,957 44 1,913 2,016 55 1,961 4,657 132 4,525
High Income Asia 1,722 1,577 145 2,031 1,967 64 4,257 3,960 297
Other Asia-Pacific 325 329 -4 751 630 121 1,522 1,252 270
Australia-NZ 670 654 16 736 715 21 1,569 1,523 46
South Africa 555 36 519 461 93 368 1,086 196 890
Sub-Saharan Africa 102 73 29 184 153 31 394 332 62
Rest of World 354 313 41 728 630 98 1,493 1,277 216











Static National Income Effects, millions of dollars (based on equivalent variation) 
  Constant returns to scale Increasing returns to scale 
  50% liberalisation of border measures 50% liberalization of border measures Full liberalization or border measures 
  Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD Total OECD 
Non- 
OECD 
Netherlands 1058 944 114 1,436 1,123 313 2,910 2,314 596
France 1858 1670 188 2,183 1,858 325 4,615 3,922 693
Germany 2607 2366 241 3,475 2,709 766 7,161 5,683 1,478
Rest of EU 15 6654 6050 604 8,188 6,431 1,757 16,462 13,201 3,261
CEECs -13 84 -97 1,804 1,253 551 4,576 3,108 1,469
Mediterranean 3974 205 3769 4,305 681 3,624 8,621 1,248 7,373
North America 10952 9938 1014 14,150 10,857 3,293 27,519 21,626 5,893
South America 4863 946 3917 4,440 884 3,556 9,365 1,800 7,565
China 6046 1399 4647 -1,675 -775 -900 3,097 682 2,415
India 1197 288 909 1,189 320 869 2,424 649 1,775
High Income Asia 14556 13622 934 19,755 15,419 4,336 37,790 30,686 7,104
Other Asia-Pacific 5451 1146 4305 7,545 2,246 5,299 15,320 4,516 10,804
Australia-NZ 1343 1271 72 1,348 1,077 271 2,589 2,134 455
South Africa 638 135 503 799 198 601 1,625 401 1,223
Sub-Saharan Africa 868 90 778 1,052 178 874 2,342 395 1,947
Rest of World 1105 1050 55 2,315 1,698 617 4,454 3,324 1,130





Table 4.5  
Percent change in value of bilateral exports (f.o.b.), linear 50% cuts (*) 
 
ê from è to EU27 Non-OECD Other Total 
exports 
EU27 -6 21 13 2 
(4) 
Non-OECD 30 39 25 30 
(38) 
Other 12 26 8 14 
(15) 








Source: Model simulations.   




Figure 4.1   
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Figure 4.2  
Exports, percent change

































This annex provides an overview of the basic structure of the global CGE model employed for 
our assessment of Doha Round-based multilateral trade liberalization. The model is implemented 
in GEMPACK -- a software package designed for solving large applied general equilibrium 
models.  The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system of equations, through techniques 
described by Harrison and Pearson (1994).  More information can be obtained at the following 
URL -- http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. The reader is referred to Hertel 
(1996: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/model/Chap2.pdf) for a detailed discussion of the 
basic algebraic model structure represented by the GEMPACK code. While this appendix 
provides a broad overview of the model, detailed discussion of mathematical structure is limited 
to added features, beyond the standa rd GTAP structure. 
The model is a standard multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with 
important features related to the structure of competition (as described by Francois and Roland-
Holst 1997).  The capital accumulation mechanisms are described in Francois et al (1996b: 
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr/tp-7.htm ), while imperfect competition features 
are described in detail in Francois (1998: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr/tp-
14.htm ).  Social accounting data are based on Version 5 of the GTAP dataset  (McDougal 2001), 
with an update to reflect post-Uruguay Round protection, Agenda 2000, China’s accession to the 
WTO, and EU enlargement, as discussed in the body of the report.   
 
A.2 Overview of General Structure 
The general conceptual structure of a regional economy in the model is represented in Annex 
Figure A.1.  Within each region, firms produce output, employing land, labour, capital, and 
natural resources and combining these with intermediate inputs.  Firm output is purchased by 
consumers, government, the investment sector, and by other firms.  Firm output can also be sold 
for export.  Land is only employed in the agricultural sectors, while capital and labour (both 
skilled and unskilled) are mobile between all production sectors.  Capital is fully mobile within 
regions.  All demand sources combine imports with domestic goods to produce a composite 
good, as indicated in the figure.  In constant returns sectors, these are Armington composites.  In 
increasing returns sectors, these are composites of firm-differentiated goods. Relevant 
substitution and trade elasticities are presented in Annex Table A.1. 
 
A.3 Taxes and policy variables 
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels.  Production taxes are placed on 
intermediate or primary inputs, or on output.  Some trade taxes are modeled at the border. 
Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be 
applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports.  Where relevant, taxes are also 
placed on exports, and on primary factor income.  Finally, where relevant (as indicated by social 
accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and can be applied differentially to 
consumption of domestic and imported goods. 
Trade policy instruments are represented as import or export taxes/subsidies.  This includes 
applied most-favored nation (mfn) tariffs, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, price 
undertakings, export quotas, and other trade restrictions.  The two exceptions are service-sector 




subsequent section.  The full set of post-Uruguay Round tariff vectors is based on Francois and 
Strutt (1999) and Finger et al (1998).  This background paper includes a description of the 
methodology used to estimate post-Uruguay Round tariff rates.  Post-Uruguay Round protection 
in agriculture is taken from GTAP estimates.  The set of services trade barrier estimates is 
described below.  Tariff rates for China’s accession to the WTO are taken from Francois and 
Spinanger (2001). 
 
A.4 Trade and transportation costs and services barriers 
International trade is modeled as a process that explicitly involves trading costs, which include 
both trade and transportation services.  These trading costs reflect the transaction costs involved 
in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself.  Those trading costs 
related to international movement of goods and related logistic services are met by composite 
services purchased from a global trade services sector, where the composite "international trade 
services" activity is produced as a Cobb-Douglas composite of regional exports of trade and 
transport service exports. Trade-cost margins are based on reconciled f.o.b. and c.i.f. trade data, 
as reported in version 5.2 of the GTAP dataset. 
A second form of trade costs is known in the literature as frictional trading costs.  These 
are implemented in the service sector.  They represent real resource costs associated with 
producing a service for sale in an export market instead of the domestic market.  Conceptually, 
we have implemented a linear transformation technology between domestic and export services.  
This technology is represented in Annex Figure A.2.  The straight line AB indicates, given the 
resources necessary to produce a unit of services for the  domestic market, the feasible amount 
that can instead be produced for export using those same resources.  If there are not frictional 
barriers to trade in services, this line has slope -1.  This free-trade case is represented by the line 
AC.  As we reduce trading costs, the linear transformation line converges on the free trade line, 
as indicated in the figure. 
The basic methodology for estimation of services barriers involves the estimation of 
sector-specific gravity equations, based on aggregate GTAP data (which reports detailed trading 
patterns in services) for total imports outside of intra-NAFTA and intra-EU trade.  These 
equations have been estimated at the level of aggregation corresponding to the sectors of our 
CGE model.   




jjjjji EUaPOPaPCYaaM e++++= 4321,  
 
where Mi,j  represents imports in sector i by country j, PCYi represents per-capita income in the 
importing country, POP j is population, EU j is a dummy for EU countries, and e is an error term. 
Deviations from predicted imports are taken as an indication of barriers to trade.  These tariff 
equivalent rates are then backed out from a constant elasticity import demand function as 




















Here, T1 is the power of the tariff equivalent (1+t1 ) such that in free trade T0 =1, and [M1/M0] is 
the ratio of actual to predicted imports.  This is a reduced form, where actual prices and constant 
terms drop out because we take ratios.  The term e is the demand elasticity (taken to be the 




in Annex Table A.2, while the relevant estimates of tariff equivalents for the model sectors and 
regions are reported in Annex Table A.3.   
 
5. Agricultural quotas 
An output quota places a restriction on the volume of production. If such a supply restriction is 
binding, it implies that consumers will pay a higher price than they would pay in case of an 
unrestricted interplay of demand and supply. A wedge is created between the prices that 
consumers pay, PM and the marginal cost for the producer, PS.  Annex Figure A.3 below 
illustrates this point. The vertical distance between PM and PS at quota levels is known as the tax 
equivalent of the quota rent. Instead of applying a quota, an equivalent level of output taxation 
could be administered which has the same output reducing and price increasing effect. This is 
illustrated by the dashed line in the figure. The shaded area indicates the value of the quota rent: 
the wedge between consumer and producer prices times the level of output. It is an empirical 
matter to determine who is actually earning the quota rent. It represents income to someone in 
the economy, usually the holder of the quota right, though the rent distribution  depends on the 
institutional set-up of quota allocation and tradability. 
In our model both the EU milk quota and the sugar quota are implemented at the 
national level. Technically, this is achieved by formulating the quota as a complementarity 
problem. This formulation allows for endogenous regime switches from a state when the output 
quota is binding to a state when the quota becomes non-binding. In addition, changes in the 
value of the quota rent are endogenously determined. If t denotes the tax equivalent of the quota 
rent, and )( qqY -=  denotes the difference between the output quota q  and output q , then the 
complementary problem can be written as: 
  
(3) Y    0 ^³t  
 
where either     
t > 0 and  Y = 0  the quota is binding  
or t = 0 and Y ³ 0  the quota is not binding 
 
Ignoring other tax and subsidy instruments that might be in place, the market price pm for 
commodities that are subject to a quota rent is 
(4) )1( t+×= pspm  
 
where ps denotes the producer price, which equals marginal cost in the model. The value of the 
quota rent t× ps× q is allocated as income to the regional household.   The modelling of this class 





The effects of the quota, or the effect of a possible extension of quota rights, depend 
crucially on the size of the quota rent. For intra-EU distributional analysis it is also important to 
have estimates of the size of the quota rent at member state level. Such estimates are hard to 
obtain.  Our quota rent estimates are obtained form recent studies on the EU dairy sector and 
sugar sector. The rent estimates for dairy are obtained from Berkhout et al. (2002), Bouamra-
Mechemache et al. (2002) and Kleinhanss et al. (2002). The estimates for sugar have been 
obtained from Frandsen and Jensen (2002). For the Netherlands, the percentage increase of the 
market price above marginal productions cost, i.e. the tax equivalent of the quota rent, is 
estimated at 30% for milk. This is the highest figure within the EU and shows that Dutch dairy 
producers are very quota constrained. For sugar, France and Germany are most quota 
constrained, with rent estimates as high as 140%.  
We have also applied milk and sugar quota in the accession candidate countries (CEECs). At 
the time of writing the allocation of production quota to CEEC producers is still subject to 
negotiations.  
We have followed the suggestions of the European Commission (2002) to allocate 
production quota to CEECs. For milk, the EC proposes allocations based on average deliveries 
for direct sales during the reference period 1997-99. For sugar, this amounts to allocation based 
on average production in the historic reference period 1995-1999. This quota allocation allows 
CEECS to expand their output slightly beyond current levels, i.e. the quota is currently not 
binding. But it would constrain them to attain the high output levels of the pre-reform period. 
 
A.6 The composite household and final demand structure  
Final demand is determined by an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas preference function, which allocates 
income in fixed shares to current consumption, investment, and government services. This yields 
a fixed savings rate. Government services are produced by a Leontief technology, with 
household/government transfers being endogenous. The lower-tier nest for current 
consumption is also specified as a Cobb-Douglas.  The regional capital markets adjust so that 
changes in savings match changes in regional investment expenditures.  (Note that the Cobb-
Douglas demand function is a special case of the CDE demand function employed in the 
standard GTAP model code.  It is implemented through GEMPACK parameter files.) 
 
A.7 Market Structure 
 
A.7.1 Demand for imports: Armington sectors 
The basic structure of demand in constant returns sectors is Armington preferences.  In 
Armington sectors, goods are differentiated by country of origin, and the similarity of goods 
from different regions is measured by the elasticity of substitution.  Formally, within a particular 
region, we assume that demand goods from different regions are aggregated into a composite 

























In equation (5), Mj,i,r is the quantity of Mj from region i consumed in region r.  The elasticity of 
substitution between varieties from different regions is then equal to sMj , where sMj=1/(1-rj). 
Composite imports are combined with the domestic good qD in a second CES nest, yielding the 
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The elasticity of substitution between the domestic good and composite imports is then equal to 
sDj, where sDj=1/(1-b j). At the same time, from the first order conditions, the demand for 



















































































where EM j,r represents expenditures on imports in region r on the sector j Armington composite.   
In practice, the two nests can be collapsed, so that imports compete directly with each other and 
with the corresponding domestic product.  This implies that the substitution elasticities in 
equations (1) and (2) are equal.  (These elasticities are reported in Annex Table 1). 
 
A.7.2 Imperfect competition 
As indicated in Annex Table A.1, we model manufacturing sectors and service sectors as being 
imperfectly competitive.  The approach we follow has been used in the Michigan and the WTO 
assessment of the Uruguay Round.  Recent model testing work indicates that this approach 
works “best” vis-à-vis Armington models, when tracked against actual trade patterns.  (See Fox 
1999, who uses the U.S.-Canada FTA as a natural experiment for model testing).   
Formally, within a region r, we assume that demand for differentiated intermediate 
products belonging to sector j can be derived from the following CES function, which is now 
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where gj,i,r  is the demand share preference parameter, Xj,i,r  is demand for variety i of product j in 
region r, and sj = 1/(1-Gj) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the good.  
Note that we can interpret q as the output of a constant returns assembly process, where the 
resulting composite product enters consumption and/or production.   Equation (8) could 
therefore be interpreted as representing an assembly function embedded in the production 
technology of firms that use intermediates in production of final goods, and alternatively as 
representing a CES aggregator implicit in consumer utility functions.  In the literature, and in our 
model, both cases are specified with the same functional form.  While we have technically 
dropped the Armington assumption by allowing firms to differentiate products, the vector of g 
parameters still provides a partial geographic anchor for production.  (Francois and Roland-





Globally, firms in different regions compete directly.  These firms are assumed to exhibit  
monopolistically competitive behaviour.  This means that individual firms produce unique 
varieties of good or service j, and hence are monopolists within their chosen market niche.  
Given the demand for variety, reflected in equation (8), the demand for each variety is less than 
perfectly elastic.  However, while firms are thus able to price as monopolists, free entry (at least 
in the long-run) drives their economic profits to zero, so that pricing is at average cost.  The joint 
assumptions of average cost pricing and monopoly pricing, under Bertrand behaviour, imply the 

























































(10) AC = P i f,i f,
  
The elasticity of demand for each firm fi will be defined by the following conditions. 
 
(11) zsse i f, j,jji f, j,  )(1 +  = -  
(12) 
e i f,i f,






In a fully symmetric equilibrium, we would have z=n-1.  However, the calibrated model includes 
CES weights g , in each regional CES aggregation function, that will vary for firms from 
different regions.  Under these conditions,  z is a quantity weighted measure of market share.  To 
close the system for regional production, we index total resource costs for sector j in region i by 
the resource index Z.  Full employment of resources hired by firms in the sector j in region i then 
implies the following condition. 
 







Cost functions for individual firms are defined as follows: 
 
(14) P )x b + a( = )xC( Zi j,i  j,i j,i j, i j,  
 
This specification of monopolistic competition is implemented under the “large group” 
assumption, which means that firms treat the variable n as "large", so that the perceived elasticity 
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In equation (15), n0 denotes the number of firms in the benchmark.   Through calibration, the 
initial CES weights in equation (15) include the valuation of variety.  As a result, the reduced 
form exhibits external scale effects, determined by changes in variety based on firm entry and 
exit, and determined by the substitution and scale elasticities (equation 16). 
 
A.7.3 Markups 
Our average markup estimates are reported in Annex Table A.1.  The starting point for these is 
recent estimated price-cost markups from the OECD (Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat 1996).  These 
provide estimates of markups, based on methods pioneered by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995).  
The Martins et al paper provides an overview of the recent empirical literature. 
Both Hall and Roeger focused their work on the United States.  In contrast, Martins et al 
provide estimates for most OECD Members.  However, because of data limitations, they did not 
provide estimates for the full matrix of countries and sectors.  (In other words there are empty 
cells in the matrix.)  To produce a complete matrix, Francois (2001) runs a cross-country 
regression, with dummy variables allowing for variations in markups by country (a general index 
of the degree of competition within a country) and by sector.  The resulting coefficients were 
then used to fill in missing values within the table.  The values reported in Annex Table are used 
either to calibrate the cost-disadvantage ratios and substitution elasticities under monopolistic 
competition.   They are taken from Francois (2001) and Martins et al (1996).  Their application, 
in terms of parameterizing the model, is explained in Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) 
 
A.8.  Aggregation scheme 
The basic aggregation scheme for the model  is presented in Annex Tables A.4 and A.5.  Annex 
Table A.4 provides a basic overview of the sectors and regions in the model, while Annex Table 
A.5 provides a mapping to underlying GTAP5.2 sectors and regions.  This provides a sense of 
what products are in the sector aggregates, and what countries are in the regional aggregates.  
Industrial sectors have been aggregated into three groups: Chemicals, Metal and 
electrotechnical, and Other manufactures. This sectoring scheme is motivated by the forcus of 
this study on the Netherlands. The grouping has used the detailed Dutch Input-Output table  
(CBS, 1999) with 106 industries to cluster sectors on four indicators: share in industrial output, 
share in industrial value added, labour share in value added and trade openness. See Annex 
Figure 4 for key characteristics of these clusters. The sectoring scheme is then translated into 
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Annex Table A.1 
    A B C D = (B-1)/B E = 1/D F = D/(1-D) 



















CERE Cerals 2.20 1.00 0.25 0.00 2.20 0.00 
HORT 
Horticulture & 
 other crops 2.20 1.00 0.25 0.00 2.20 0.00 
SUGA 
Sugar, plants 




&products 2.50 1.00 0.55 0.00 2.50 0.00 
CATLE 
Cattle & beef 
 products 2.45 1.00 0.57 0.00 2.45 0.00 
DAIRY Milk & dairy 2.20 1.00 0.65 0.00 2.20 0.00 
OAGR Other agriculture 2.75 1.00 0.20 0.00 2.75 0.00 
PROCF 
Processed food 
 products 2.47 1.13 1.12 0.11 8.98 0.13 
TEXT 
Textiles, leather 
 & clothing 3.32 1.13 1.26 0.11 8.91 0.13 
EXTR 
Extraction 
industries 2.80 1.18 0.20 0.15 6.64 0.18 
CHEM 
Petro & 




industry 3.39 1.21 1.26 0.17 5.72 0.21 
OIND Other industries 2.30 1.20 1.26 0.17 5.95 0.20 
TRAD Trade services 1.90 1.27 1.68 0.21 4.67 0.27 
TRAN 
Transport 





services 1.90 1.27 1.26 0.21 4.67 0.27 
OSVC 
 Other private 
 and public 
 services 1.97 1.27 1.29 0.21 4.67 0.27 
 
sources:  columns A, C are from the GTAP database.  Columns B, D, E, and F are from 




Annex Table A.2 
Services regression results 
 
TRADE: trade services     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.80     
R Square 0.64     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.55     
Standard Error 0.65     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8.955 2.985 7.097 0.0053 
Residual 12 5.047 0.421   
Total 15 14.002       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept 0.317 1.995 0.159   
pop 0.728 0.173 4.202   
PCI 0.500 0.158 3.170   
EU 0.684 0.466 1.467   
      
TRAN: transport and logistics services    
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.98     
R Square 0.96     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.94     
Standard Error 0.27     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 18.313 6.104 86.036 0.000 
Residual 12 0.851 0.071   
Total 15 19.165       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -2.645 0.819 -3.229   
pop 0.803 0.071 11.288   
PCI 0.919 0.065 14.183   
EU 0.307 0.192 1.605   
Annex Table A.2 – continued 
 
BSRV: business services     




Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.88     
R Square 0.78     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.72     
Standard Error 0.59     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 14.490 4.830 14.083 0.0003 
Residual 12 4.116 0.343   
Total 15 18.606       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -1.179 1.801 -0.654   
pop 0.789 0.156 5.045   
PCI 0.766 0.143 5.377   
EU 0.535 0.421 1.271   
      
      
OSVC: other services     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.88     
R Square 0.77     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.71     
Standard Error 0.68     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 18.611 6.204 13.279 0.0004 
Residual 12 5.606 0.467   
Total 15 24.217       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -3.287 2.102 -1.564   
pop 0.844 0.183 4.623   
PCI 0.909 0.166 5.466   





Annex Table A.3 
Estimated services barriers (extra-EU trade) 
 
Estimated Services Trade Barriers (percent trade cost equivalents) 
      








NLD Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FRA France 12.3 12.1 18.3 19.2 
DEU Germany 0.0 13.7 9.5 0.0 
REU15 Rest of EU 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEC CEECs 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MED Mediterranean and Middle East 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NAM North America 0.0 22.6 1.2 16.0 
SAM South America 13.8 10.4 8.6 5.9 
CHINA China 0.0 14.5 37.4 3.7 
INDIA India 61.3 63.9 32.1 62.2 
HINCAS High income Asia 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand 0.0 2.3 9.5 15.2 
SAF South Africa 28.3 17.5 32.8 22.6 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW Rest of World 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 





Annex Table A.4 
Model Aggregation Scheme 
 
Model Sectors and Regions
Label Region Label Sector
NLD Netherlands CERE Cerals
FRA France HORT Horticulture & other crops
DEU Germany SUGA Sugar, plants and processed
REU15 Rest of EU INTLIV Intensive livestock &products
CEEC CEECs CATLE Cattle & beef products
MED Mediterannean and Middle East DAIRY Milk & dairy
NAM North America OAGR Other agriculture
SAM South America PROCF Processed food products
CHINA China TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing
INDIA India EXTR Extraction industries
HINCAS High income asia CHEM Petro & chemicals
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific MELE Metal and electotechnical ind
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand OIND Other industries
SAF South Africs TRAD Trade services
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TRAN Transport services
ROW Rest of World BSVC Business, financial & communnications services






Annex Table A.5 
 Mapping to GTAP Sectors and Regions 
Model  
Sector GTAP Sector 
Model  
Region GTAP Region -- continued 
 CERE pdr,  Paddy rice                       OASPAC  phl, Philippines                     
 CERE wht,  Wheat                            HINCAS sgp, Singapore                       
 CERE gro,  Cereal grains nec                OASPAC  tha, Thailand                        
 HORT v_f,  Vegetables, fruit, nuts          OASPAC  vnm,  Vietnam                         
 HORT osd, Oil seeds                        OASPAC  bgd, Bangladesh                      
 SUGA c_b, Sugar cane, sugar beet           INDIA ind, India                           
 HORT pfb, Plant-based fibers               OASPAC  lka, Sri Lanka                       
 HORT ocr, Crops nec                        HINCAS xsa,  Rest of South Asia              
 CATLE ctl, Cattle,sheep,goats,horses        NAM can, Canada                          
 INTLIV oap, Animal products nec              NAM usa, United States                   
 DAIRY rmk, Raw milk                         SAM mex, Mexico                          
 OAGR wol, Wool, silk -worm cocoons          SAM xcm, Central America, Caribbean      
 OAGR for, Forestry                         SAM col, Colombia                        
 OAGR fsh, Fishing                          SAM per, Peru                            
 EXTR col, Coal                             SAM ven, Venezuela                       
 EXTR oil, Oil                              SAM xap,  Rest of Andean Pact             
 EXTR gas, Gas                              SAM arg, Argentina                       
 EXTR omn, Minerals nec                     SAM bra, Brazil                          
 CATLE cmt, Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse   SAM chl, Chile                           
 INTLIV omt. Meat products nec                SAM ury, Uruguay                         
 PROCF vol, Vegetable oils and fats          SAM xsm,  Rest of South America           
 DAIRY mil, Dairy products                   REU15 aut,  Austria                         
 PROCF pcr, Processed rice                   REU15 bel, Belgium                         
 SUGA sgr, Sugar                            REU15 dnk,  Denmark                         
 PROCF ofd, Food products nec                REU15 fin,  Finland                         
 PROCF b_t, Beverages and tobacco products   FRA fra, France                          
 TEXT tex, Textiles                         DEU deu, Germany                         
 TEXT wap, Wearing apparel                  REU15 gbr, United Kingdom                  
 TEXT lea, Leather products                 DEU grc, Greece                          
 OIND lum, Wood products                    REU15 irl, Ireland                         
 OIND ppp, Paper products, publishing       REU15 ita, Italy                           
 CHEM p_c, Petroleum, coal products         REU15 lux,  Luxembourg                      
 CHEM crp, Chemical,rubber,plastic prods    NLD nld, Netherlands                     
 CHEM nmm, Mineral products nec             REU15 prt, Portugal                        
 MELE i_s, Ferrous metals                   REU15 esp, Spain                           
 MELE nfm, Metals nec                       REU15 swe, Sweden                          
 MELE fmp, Metal products                   ROW  che, Switzerland                     
 MELE mvh, Motor vehicles and parts         ROW  xef,  Rest of EFTA                    
 MELE otn, Transport equipment nec          CEEC  bgr, Bulgaria                        
 MELE ele, Electronic equipment             CEEC  hrv,  Croatia                         
 MELE ome, Machinery and equipment nec      CEEC  cze, Czech Republic                  
 OIND omf, Manufactures nec                 CEEC  hun, Hungary                         
 OSVC ely, Electricity                      CEEC  mlt, Malta                           
 OSVC gdt, Gas manufacture, distribution    CEEC  pol, Poland                          
 OSVC wtr, Water                            CEEC  rom, Romania                         
 OSVC cns, Construction                     CEEC  svk, Slovakia                        
 TRAD trd, Trade                            CEEC  svn, Slovenia                        
 TRAN otp, Transport nec                    CEEC  est, Estonia                         
 TRAN wtp, Sea transport                    CEEC  lva,  Latvia                          
 TRAN atp, Air transport                    CEEC  ltu,  Lithuania                       
 BSVC cmn, Communication                    ROW  xsu, Rest of Former Soviet Union     
 BSVC ofi, Financial services nec           MED cyp, Cyprus                          
 BSVC isr, Insurance                        MED tur, Turkey                          
 BSVC obs, Business services nec            MED xme, Rest of Middle East             
 OSVC ros, Recreation and other services    MED mar, Morocco                         
 OSVC osg, PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat   MED xnf, Rest of North Africa            
 OSVC dwe, Dwellings                        SSA bwa, Botswana                        
 SAF xsc, Rest of SACU                    
Model  
Region GTAP Region  SSA mwi, Malawi                          
 AUSNZ aus, Australia                        SSA moz, Mozambique                      
 AUSNZ nzl, New Zealand                      SSA tza, Tanzania                        
 CHINA chn, China                            SSA zmb, Zambia                          
 CHINA hkg, Hong Kong                        SSA zwe, Zimbabwe                        
 HINCAS jpn, Japan                            SSA xsf, Other Southern Africa           
 HINCAS kor, Korea                            SSA uga, Uganda                          
 HINCAS twn, Taiwan                           SSA xss, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa      
 OASPAC  idn,  Indonesia                        ROW  xrw,  Rest of World                   
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